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Abstract. In this paper we study the logical foundations of automated inductive theorem
proving. To that aim we first develop a theoretical model that is centered around the
difficulty of finding induction axioms which are sufficient for proving a goal.
Based on this model, we then analyze the following aspects: the choice of a proof
shape, the choice of an induction rule and the language of the induction formula. In
particular, using model-theoretic techniques, we clarify the relationship between notions of
inductiveness that have been considered in the literature on automated inductive theorem
proving.
This is a corrected version of the paper https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01930v5 pub-
lished originally on Nov. 16, 2017.
1. Introduction
Theories of (natural number) arithmetic have been of great interest to mathematical logicians
since the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, work was mainly devoted to questions
of consistency. Deep connections that link the definability-theoretic aspects of arithmetic and
theories of computation were later discovered and fruitfully developed. In the 1970s and 80s,
relevant model-theoretic techniques became mature enough for establishing mathematically
interesting unprovability results. While the model theory of arithmetic evolved into a subject
of its own, the connections with theories of computation found their way down to the
complexity-theoretic level. Nowadays, theories of arithmetic have penetrated almost every
branch of mathematical logic, including mathematical philosophy.
Rather independently of this work, the subject of inductive theorem proving developed
in computer science. In this tradition, the central aim is to develop algorithms that
find proofs by induction and to implement these algorithms efficiently. This subject is
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characterized by a great variety of different methods (and systems implementing these
methods), for example, rippling [BBHI05], theory exploration [CJRS13], integration into
a superposition prover [KP13, Cru15, WW], recursion analysis [BM79, Ste88, BvHH+89],
proof by consistency [Com01], and cyclic proofs [BS11, BGP12]. Recently, a benchmark
suite for inductive theorem proving has been presented [CJRS15].
The aim of our work is to apply methods and results from the former tradition in
mathematical logic to the tradition in computer science. The main advantage of this
combination is that it is possible to obtain unprovability results (by model-theoretic means)
where previously in the literature on inductive theorem proving only empirical observations
could be made based on the failure of a specific algorithm to find a proof.
A first obstacle in realizing such an application is that the above mentioned approaches
to inductive theorem proving are quite different. This makes it difficult to provide a common
theoretical basis. However, the final result is typically, in one way or another, explicitly or
implicitly, a proof of the goal from instances of an induction scheme and basic axioms from
a background theory. We take this observation as a guiding principle for the development of
a theoretical model of inductive theorem proving in Section 2. This is the main conceptual
contribution of this paper.
In terms of technical contributions we analyze the following aspects of methods for
inductive theorem proving: (a) the choice of a proof shape, (b) the choice of the induction
rule, and (c) the language of the induction formula. Despite the differences between the
existing methods for inductive theorem proving, these aspects play a role in most of them.
Mathematically, the technical contributions of this paper are: we show that the equivalence
proof shape for inductive proofs (see Section 3) is complete but that the uniform proof
shape is not. We show that Walther’s method for comparing induction axioms [Wal92] is
not complete (Section 4.3). We make the (possibly surprising) observation that the weakest
induction axiom for proving an induction axiom may not be that induction axiom itself
(Proposition 6.1). We establish the strictness of the implications between several frequently
used notions of inductiveness (Section 7). We also include the result, due to Kaye, that PA−
proves the least number principle in the language of rings (Theorem 8.3).
This paper is structured as follows: after developing our model of inductive theorem
proving in Section 2, we study the completeness of proof shapes in Section 3. In Section 4
we describe different formulations of induction and study their equivalence in both a general
and a quantifier-free context. In Section 5 we establish non-closure properties of PA−-cuts
that will be used in the rest of the paper. In Section 6 we investigate two ways of comparing
different induction formulas that prove the same theorem. In Section 7, which is central to
this paper, we compare different notions of inductiveness. (A formula is called inductive in
the sense of a particular induction rule if it satisfies the hypotheses of this rule provably
in the base theory.) In Section 8 we study the effect of the choice of the language for the
induction formula using an example involving the <-relation.
This is a corrected version of the paper https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01930v5 pub-
lished originally on Nov. 16, 2017. As Emil Jerˇa´bek pointed out, two questions posed in the
original version already had answers in the literature, and Shepherdson almost proved the
main result of Section 8. The answers to these questions are incorporated in this paper as
Theorem 4.8 and Theorem 8.4, and we added attribution to Shepherdson’s work in Section 8.
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2. A theoretical model of inductive theorem proving
This section is devoted to developing a theoretical model of inductive theorem proving.
This is necessary in order to provide a conceptually and formally clear basis for relating
mathematical results to algorithms in automated deduction.
2.1. First-order theories of the natural numbers. In this paper we restrict our atten-
tion to first-order theories of the natural numbers (as opposed to, e.g., general inductive data
types which is a more common choice in inductive theorem proving). This is a pragmatic
choice which is motivated by the following reasons: (1) the mathematical study of these
theories is very well developed, and (2) the central problems of inductive theorem proving
also surface in this restricted setting. To the mathematical logician this may not seem
a restriction since coding allows us to describe an arbitrary inductive data type as a set
of natural numbers. However, the increase of the syntactic complexity of formulas and
proofs based on coding renders this approach unfit for practical applications, where bounded
quantifiers are usually as costly as unbounded quantifiers.
Throughout this paper, we work over the base theory PA−. It is finitely axiomatized,
induction-free, and a fragment of Peano arithmetic (PA). Robinson’s Q is another commonly
used base theory for arithmetic. There are two main reasons for choosing PA− instead of Q
as the base theory in this paper. First, if one adopts Q as the base theory, then even a slight
change in the definitions can make a significant difference in the results. This is due to the
fact that many simple arithmetic properties, for example,
∀x, y (x < y + 1↔ x 6 y),
are not provable in Q; cf. Lemma 4.4. We do not want such details to distract us. Second,
we can extract useful information about notions of inductiveness in Section 7 over PA−. On
the contrary, Robinson’s Q is too weak to prove any non-trivial implication between our
notions of inductiveness. More specifically, Proposition 7.1(e) and (f) become false if one
changes the base theory to Q. Nevertheless, many other results in this paper, for example,
Theorem 3.1, Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 5.2, remain true over Q.
Definition 2.1. Denote the language {0, 1,+,×, <} for ordered rings by LOR. Abusing
notation, if n ∈ N, then we denote the closed LOR term
(· · · ((0 + 1) + 1) + · · ·+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-many 1’s
by n. Let PA− denote the theory of the non-negative parts of discretely ordered rings. We
axiomatize PA− by the following.
(1) ∀x ∀y ∀z ((x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)).
(2) ∀x ∀y (x+ y = y + x).
(3) ∀x ∀y ∀z ((x× y)× z = x× (y × z)).
(4) ∀x ∀y (x× y = y × x).
(5) ∀x ∀y ∀z (x× (y + z) = (x× y) + (x× z)).
(6) ∀x (x+ 0 = x).
(7) ∀x (x× 0 = 0).
(8) ∀x (x× 1 = x).
(9) ∀x ∀y ∀z (x < y ∧ y < z → x < z).
(10) ∀x ¬x < x.
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(11) ∀x ∀y (x < y ∨ x = y ∨ x > y).
(12) ∀x ∀y ∀z (x < y → x+ z < y + z).
(13) ∀x ∀y ∀z (z 6= 0 ∧ x < y → x× z < y × z).
(14) ∀x ∀y (x < y ↔ ∃z ((x+ z) + 1 = y)).
(15) 0 < 1 ∧ ∀x (x > 0→ x > 1).
(16) ∀x (x > 0).
Here x 6 y is an abbreviation for x < y ∨ x = y.
Definition 2.2. If θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula, then the induction axiom for θ with respect
to the variable x, denoted by Ixθ or simply Iθ, is the sentence
∀z¯ (θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(x+ 1, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
Define
IOpen = PA− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula},
IΣk = PA
− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula of complexity Σk}, and
PA = PA− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula}.
2.2. The necessity of non-analyticity. It has often been observed in the literature on
inductive theorem proving that “within first-order theories that include induction, the
cut rule cannot be eliminated” [BBHI05, p. 55]. This observation will provide a crucial
foundation for the justification of our model of inductive theorem proving. Therefore we
would like to discuss it here and, in the process, make it more precise and show how to prove
it.
Since we want to speak about cut-elimination we need to speak about the sequent
calculus. Which variant of the sequent calculus we use is not of importance for the points
discussed here; for the sake of precision let us fix it to be the calculus LK of [Bus98a]. A
sequent is denoted as Γ −→ ∆. For a theory T and a formula ϕ, T ` ϕ if and only if there
is a finite set T0 ⊆ T and an LK-proof of the sequent T0 −→ ϕ. Gentzen’s cut-elimination
theorem states that:
Theorem 2.3. If there is an LK-proof of a sequent Γ −→ ∆, then there is a cut-free
LK-proof of Γ −→ ∆.
An important feature of cut-free proofs is that they have the subformula property. In
the context of first-order logic this means that every formula that occurs in a cut-free proof
of the sequent Γ −→ ∆ is an instance of a subformula of a formula that occurs in Γ −→ ∆.
A proof that has the subformula property is also called analytic.
Since the cut-elimination theorem considers arbitrary first-order sequents, it can also be
applied to theories containing induction axioms:
Corollary 2.4. If PA ` ϕ then there is a finite A0 ⊆ PA and a cut-free LK-proof of the
sequent A0 −→ ϕ.
So we see that in the sense of the above corollary, inductive theories do allow cut-
elimination. However, A0 may contain induction axioms on induction formulas which are
not instances of subformulas of ϕ, i.e., non-analytic induction formulas.
The necessity of non-analytic induction formulas follows, for example, from Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem: recall that, by arithmetizing the syntax of formulas and
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proofs, one can formulate the consistency of a recursive arithmetical theory as an LOR
sentence. More specifically, for all k ∈ N there is a Π1 sentence Con(IΣk) expressing the
consistency of IΣk, see for example [Bus98b]. We then have:
Theorem 2.5. For all k ∈ N: PA ` Con(IΣk) but IΣk 0 Con(IΣk).
Note that this result embodies a very strong non-analyticity requirement: given any
k > 1, in order to prove Con(IΣk) not only do we need a non-analytic induction formula,
but we need one with more than k quantifier alternations even though Con(IΣk) is only a
Π1 sentence.
This theorem entails the necessity of cut in the following sense. First, formulate induction
as the inference rule
Γ −→ ∆, ψ(0) Γ, ψ(x) −→ ∆, ψ(s(x))
Γ −→ ∆, ∀xψ(x) Ind
with the usual side condition and ψ being an arbitrary formula. Observe that PA ` ϕ if
and only if there is an LK + Ind-proof of PA− −→ ϕ. Now, in contrast to LK, the calculus
LK + Ind does not have cut-elimination:
Corollary 2.6. There is a formula ϕ such that PA− −→ ϕ has an LK + Ind-proof but no
cut-free LK + Ind-proof.
Proof. Let ϕ = Con(IΣk) for any k > 3. Then, by Theorem 2.5, PA ` Con(IΣk) and
consequently there is an LK + Ind-proof of PA− −→ Con(IΣk). On the other hand, suppose
there would be a cut-free LK+Ind-proof of PA− −→ Con(IΣk). Then, due to the subformula
property, all formulas, and in particular: all induction formulas, in this proof would be Σ3
thus contradicting Theorem 2.5.
These considerations show that the observation formulated at the beginning of this
section can be stated more precisely, and without mentioning the cut rule, as: inductive
theorem proving requires the use of non-analytic induction axioms.
Remember that the notion of analyticity is to be understood in the sense of first-order
logic here. If we would move to second- or even higher-order logic, for example by formulating
the theorem-proving problem in terms of the second-order induction axiom, then, in the
presence of second-order quantifiers, the meaning of the subformula property, and with
it that of analyticity, changes. Indeed, the non-analytic induction axioms of a PA-proof
translate to instances (in the sense of second-order logic) of the second-order induction
axiom. Thus a PA-proof translates into a proof which is analytic in the sense of second-order
logic. But this is merely a change in terminology, not in substance and therefore we will not
consider this option.
2.3. A computational observation. In this section we take a closer look at the practice
of inductive theorem proving and, in particular, at the aspect of non-analytic induction
axioms as described above.
The set of sentences which are realistic as input to an inductive theorem prover in
practice is naturally fuzzy and we cannot claim to make it precise here. What we have
in mind are goals such as those of the TIP library [CJRS15]. They typically consist of a
universally quantified atomic formula to be proved from some background axioms consisting
also of universally quantified atomic formulas. They have a size between a few dozen to
several hundred symbols and proofs with a symbolic complexity of one or two orders of
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magnitude that of the goal. In comparison to arbitrary arithmetical sentences, this is a quite
restricted class. Its consideration is justified on the one hand by the practical interest in
goals of this form and, on the other hand, by the difficulty of the inductive theorem proving
problem in general. We also restrict our attention to input sentences σ such that PA ` σ.
The recognition of non-theorems as such, while clearly of high practical value, is a different
topic which we do not consider in this paper.
Now, given a realistic input sentence σ, there are, in theory, the following options for
generating (non-analytic) induction axioms which suffice to prove σ. (1) One can use coding,
for example as in the proof of the finite axiomatizability of IΣk in [HP93, Theorem I.2.52].
Thus one can formulate the theorem-proving problem in IΣk (for a k sufficiently high for
practical purposes) as a theorem-proving problem in pure first-order logic, thereby eliminating
the need of generating further induction axioms. However, coding introduces an overhead
which, although constant, is so high that it dominates the complexity of all practically
relevant instances to such an extent that this approach is not useful in practice. (2) Similar
to but even simpler than (1), one can just fix a k, sufficiently high for practical purposes,
so that we are interested only in finding proofs whose induction axioms contain at most k
symbols. Since there are only a finite number of such induction axioms, the theorem-proving
problem, again, becomes a pure first-order problem. Just as in (1), although this avoids
the need of generating further induction axioms, it introduces a syntactic overhead which
renders this approach useless in practice (even though coding does not play a role here).
So, in practice, these brute force methods are not an option. Instead, one typically tries
to find simple induction axioms, tailored to the goal, and a proof of the goal based on them.
Again, we cannot claim to make this notion precise here but we refer to typical solutions of
the TIP problems as listed, e.g., in [IB96]. We can now make the following computational
observation:
Computational Observation. For sentences σ which are input to an inductive theorem
prover: if it is feasible to find simple formulas θ1, . . . , θn such that PA
− + {Iθ1, . . . , Iθn} ` σ,
then it is feasible to find a proof in pure first-order logic of σ from PA− + {Iθ1, . . . , Iθn}.
It is important to note here that the input sentence σ and the induction formulas θi
are restricted as discussed above. The word “feasible” is to be understood in the sense of
the possibility of an implementation which solves the task successfully on contemporary
hardware in a reasonable amount of time.
The observation is based on the following grounds. First, automated theorem proving
in pure first-order logic is a subject that has undergone continuous progress for decades and
has reached a quite mature state. The regular CASC-competition [Sut16] is a testament
to that as is the widespread use of first-order theorem provers in external tools, e.g.,
Sledgehammer [PB12]. Inductive theorem proving, and in particular the generation of
simple non-analytic induction invariants, does not enjoy a comparable level of stability
and maturity (yet?). Secondly, and in terms of concrete evidence, we have considered 53
proofs of problems from the TIP-library. These proofs have been manually entered in the
GAPT-system [EHR+16] by a student of the first author (for another purpose). Of these 53
proofs, GAPT’s built-in first-order prover Escargot, which is a quite simple superposition
prover, could re-prove 48 based on the induction axioms alone within a timeout of 1 minute
per proof using, on average, 3.3 seconds per proof on standard PC hardware.
Another way to put this computational observation is the following: as described in
Section 2.2, the search space in inductive theorem proving has two dimensions: (1) the search
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for instances of the induction scheme which prove the goal, and (2) the search for a proof in
pure first-order logic of the goal from these instances. The above computational observation
then states that, for input sentences and induction formulas considered in practice, the
search space extends so much more in the first dimension than in the second that we can
afford to disregard the second. This observation forms an important basis for our theoretical
model of inductive theorem proving.
2.4. One induction axiom is enough. As a final step towards our model of inductive
theorem proving, we will see in this section that we can restrict our attention to the use of a
single induction axiom.
Definition 2.7. An LOR formula ϕ(x) is called inductive if PA
− ` ϕ(0) and PA− `
∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1)).
If ϕ(x) is an inductive formula, then ∀x ϕ(x) is trivially equivalent over PA− to the
induction axiom
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1))→ ∀x ϕ(x).
Therefore, sentences of the form ∀x ϕ(x), where ϕ(x) is inductive, can be viewed as particular
instances of parameter-free induction axioms. Conversely, as Lemma 2.8 below shows, every
induction axiom is equivalent over PA− to an induction axiom of this form. As a result,
every induction axiom corresponds to an inductive formula, and the full induction scheme
is equivalent to its parameter-free counterpart. The argument is presumably well known,
cf. Kaye [Kay91, Exercise 8.3].
Lemma 2.8. Let θ(x, z¯) be an LOR formula. Define ϕ(x) to be
∀z¯ (θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀y (θ(y, z¯)→ θ(y + 1, z¯))→ θ(x, z¯)).
Then ϕ(x) is inductive and PA− ` Ixθ ↔ ∀x ϕ(x).
Proof. Let us first verify that ϕ(x) is inductive. Work over PA−. We have ϕ(0) trivially.
Suppose x0 is such that ϕ(x0) holds, and take z¯ such that the hypothesis in ϕ(x0 + 1) holds,
i.e.,
θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀y (θ(y, z¯)→ θ(y + 1, z¯)).
Then θ(x0, z¯) must be true since ϕ(x0), and thus θ(x0 + 1, z¯) is also true by the second
conjunct displayed above. This shows ϕ(x0 + 1).
Next, we verify that PA− ` Ixθ ↔ ∀x ϕ(x). Work over PA− again. Suppose ∀x ϕ(x).
Take z¯ such that
θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀y (θ(y, z¯)→ θ(y + 1, z¯)).
We want ∀x θ(x, z¯). So pick any x0. We know ϕ(x0) holds by hypothesis. Thus θ(x0, z¯) by
the definition of ϕ(x), as required.
Conversely, assume Ixθ holds, i.e.,
∀z¯ (θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀y (θ(y, z¯)→ θ(y + 1, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
Let x0 be arbitrary. We want ϕ(x0). So take any z¯ such that θ(0, z¯)∧∀y
(
θ(y, z¯)→ θ(y + 1, z¯)).
Then our assumption implies θ(x0, z¯), which is what we want.
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The key idea behind the lemma above is that inductive formulas are, in a sense, closed
under definable conjunction. In particular, any two induction axioms are implied by a third
over PA−.
Proposition 2.9 (Gentzen [Gen54]). For all LOR formulas θ0, θ1, there is an inductive
formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)→ Iθ0 ∧ Iθ1.
Proof. Apply Lemma 2.8 to find inductive formulas ψ0(x) and ψ1(x) such that PA
− ` Iθi ↔
∀x ψi(x) for each i < 2. Define ϕ(x) = ψ0(x) ∧ ψ1(x). As ψ0(x) and ψ1(x) are both
inductive, it is easy to see that ϕ(x) is inductive too. Moreover, the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) implies
∀x ψ0(x) ∧ ∀x ψ1(x) and thus also Iθ0 ∧ Iθ1 over PA−.
The above proof straightforwardly generalizes to an arbitrary number of LOR formulas
θ1, . . . , θn and so we obtain:
Corollary 2.10. Let σ be an LOR sentence. Then PA ` σ if and only if there is an
inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)→ σ.
Since we only use simple syntactic operations (conjunction in Corollary 2.10 and the
definition in the statement of Lemma 2.8) to combine many induction axioms into one, the
computational observation is preserved even when restricted to a single induction axiom.
Our theoretical model for inductive theorem proving is now the following computational
problem.
ITP
Input: A sentence σ provable in PA
Output: An inductive formula ϕ(x) s.t. PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)→ σ
Formally this just defines a binary relation (between σ and ϕ(x)). But of course, implicitly,
we take the perspective of wanting to compute such a ϕ(x) from a given σ. We claim
that this computational problem is a suitable theoretical model of the practice of inductive
theorem proving. This claim rests on the computational observation made in Section 2.3 and
sharpened in this section. In the rest of this paper we will study this problem, in particular
by relating it to several of its variants.
3. Variations of the proof shape
The ITP problem as defined above induces a natural proof shape: the combination of (i) a
PA−-proof of the induction base, (ii) a PA−-proof of the induction step, and (iii) a PA−-proof
of ∀x ϕ(x)→ σ. As long as we use ordinary successor induction, there is no freedom in the
first two proof obligations, there is however in the third. In this section we will consider two
variants of ITP which are obtained by modifying (iii).
The sharp-eyed reader may have noticed that the inductive formula ϕ(x) in our proof of
Proposition 2.9 actually makes PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ Iθ0 ∧ Iθ1. We can use this to obtain
Theorem 3.1. Let σ be an LOR sentence. Then PA ` σ if and only if there is an inductive
formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ σ.
Proof. The “if” direction is clear from the definition of inductive formulas. For the “only
if” direction, apply Proposition 2.9 to find an inductive formula ψ(x) such that PA− `
∀x ψ(x)→ σ. We verify that
ϕ(x) = ¬σ → ψ(x)
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTIVE THEOREM PROVING 9
has the properties we want. First, it is clear that PA− ` σ → ∀x ϕ(x). Second, work over PA−,
and suppose ¬σ. Since PA− ` ∀x ψ(x)→ σ, this implies ∃x ¬ψ(x). If x0 is such that ¬ψ(x0),
then ¬σ ∧ ¬ψ(x0) and so ¬ϕ(x0). We can thus conclude PA− ` ¬σ → ¬∀x ϕ(x). Finally,
the formula ϕ(x) is inductive because it is equivalent to either x = x or ψ(x) depending on
whether σ holds or not, and both x = x and ψ(x) are inductive.
This is a particular case of a more general phenomenon. As a normal form theorem in a
very broad sense, it is perhaps reminiscent of the Friedman–Goldfarb–Harrington Theorem
and its generalizations [Vis05, Joo15], which assert that over a sufficiently strong base theory,
every LOR sentence is equivalent to a consistency statement. This result motivates the
consideration of the equivalence version of ITP:
ITPEq
Input: A sentence σ provable in PA
Output: An inductive formula ϕ(x) s.t. PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ σ
Theorem 3.1 ensures that, just as ITP, also ITPEq is a total relation in the sense that for
every input there is an output as required. However, for a fixed σ the ϕ(x)’s permitted in
ITPEq are a strongly restricted subset of those permitted in ITP. This leads to a significant
reduction of the search space. Typically, restrictions of the search space play a crucial role
for automated theorem proving in practice. We are not aware of a technique that would
exploit this reduction of ITP to ITPEq. In how far this restriction to equivalent formulas is
useful in practice therefore remains unclear for the time being.
Another modification of the proof shape of ITP consists of considering a universally
quantified σ, i.e., σ = ∀x ψ(x), and seeking an inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− `
∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)). This is of relevance to computer science since it corresponds to the
treatment of loops in correctness proofs for imperative programs by loop invariants as in
the Hoare calculus [AdBO09, BM07]. As one may expect, this method does not work for all
PA-provable formulas.
Proposition 3.2. There is an LOR formula ψ(x) such that PA ` ∀x ψ(x) but no inductive
formula ϕ(x) makes PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)).
Proof. Pick an LOR sentence σ that is provable in PA but not in PA
−. Consider the
LOR formula ψ(x), which is defined to be
σ ∨ x 6= 0.
Then PA ` ∀x ψ(x) because PA ` σ. Let M |= PA−+¬σ, which exists since PA− 0 σ. Then
M |= ¬ψ(0) by the definition of ψ(x). Therefore, for no formula ϕ(x) can
PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)) ∧ ϕ(0).
As a result, the following uniform version of ITP
ITPU
Input: A sentence ∀x ψ(x) provable in PA
Output: An inductive formula ϕ(x) s.t. PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x))
is not a total relation. Nevertheless, some weak form of completeness is still possible if we
restrict ourselves to simple enough LOR sentences provable in a sufficiently weak fragment
of PA, as the following theorem shows.
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Definition 3.3. An LOR formula is bounded if all the quantifiers it contains are of the form
∀x<t or ∃x<t, where t is a term in LOR that does not involve the variable x. Bounded
formulas are also called ∆0 formulas. The theory I∆0 is
PA− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is a bounded LOR formula}.
Fix a bounded formula y = 2x such that
I∆0 ` ∀x, y, y′ (y = 2x ∧ y′ = 2x → y = y′)
∧ 20 = 1 ∧ ∀x, y (y = 2x ↔ 2y = 2x+1).
Let exp be the axiom ∀x ∃y (y = 2x).
See Section V.3(c) in Ha´jek–Pudla´k [HP93], for example, for a construction of the
formula y = 2x.
Theorem 3.4 (Wilkie–Paris). The following are equivalent for a bounded formula ψ(x).
(i) I∆0 + exp ` ∀x ψ(x).
(ii) There is an inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)).
Proof. See Corollary 8.7 in Wilkie–Paris [WP87] or Theorem V.5.26 in Ha´jek–Pudla´k [HP93].
4. Different forms of induction
In our definition of ITP we have fixed the induction scheme to the ordinary successor
induction. This is by no means the only choice. It is well known that the induction
scheme has many equivalent formulations. In this section we will introduce those alternative
formulations that we treat in this paper, and start to study their relationship, both in
the general and in the quantifier-free setting. Our interest in the quantifier-free setting is
motivated by the fact that some methods for inductive theorem proving restrict themselves
to quantifier-free induction formulas, see, e.g. [BM79].
4.1. Different induction schemes.
Definition 4.1. Let θ(x, z¯) be an LOR formula. We define the following induction axioms:
• The <-induction axiom I<x θ is
∀z¯
(
∀y (∀x<y θ(x, z¯)→ θ(y, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
• Let n ∈ N. The (n+ 1)-step induction axiom I(n+ 1)-stepx θ is
∀z¯
( ∧
k<n+1
θ(k, z¯) ∧ ∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(x+ n+ 1, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
• Let n ∈ N. The (n+ 1)-induction axiom In+1x θ is
∀z¯
( ∧
k<n+1
θ(k, z¯) ∧ ∀x
( ∧
k<n+1
θ(x+ k, z¯)→ θ(x+ n+ 1, z¯)
)
→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)
)
.
• The polynomial induction axiom Ipxθ is
∀z¯
(
θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(2x, z¯) ∧ θ(2x+ 1, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
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Each of these schemes naturally induces a notion of inductiveness.
Definition 4.2. Let ϕ(x) be an LOR formula with precisely one free variable x.
• ϕ(x) is <-inductive if PA− ` ∀y (∀x<y ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y)).
• Let n ∈ N. We say ϕ(x) is (n+ 1)-step inductive if
PA− `
∧
k<n+1
ϕ(k) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ n+ 1)).
• Let n ∈ N. We say ϕ(x) is (n+ 1)-inductive if
PA− `
∧
k<n+1
ϕ(k) ∧ ∀x
( ∧
k<n+1
ϕ(x+ k)→ ϕ(x+ n+ 1)
)
.
• ϕ(x) is polynomially inductive, or simply p-inductive, if
PA− ` ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(2x) ∧ ϕ(2x+ 1)).
The first of the above formulations, <-induction, is also known as strong induction and
is commonly used in mathematics. The consideration of (n+ 1)-step induction is motivated
by its use in [BBHI05]. The k-induction scheme has become popular in computer-aided
verification, see, e.g., [SSS00, DKR11]. Polynomial induction has been introduced by Buss
in [Bus86] for the study of weak arithmetical theories and their relation to computational
complexity classes. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the base-2 polynomial induction
scheme in order to keep the exposition sufficiently simple; see Remark 7.5 for some extra
information about other bases.
Proposition 4.3. The following are equivalent for every n ∈ N:
(i) PA = PA− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula};
(ii) PA− + {I<x θ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula};
(iii) PA− + {I(n+ 1)-stepx θ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula};
(iv) PA− + {In+1x θ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula};
(v) PA− + {Ipxθ : θ(x, z¯) is an LOR formula}.
The proof of Proposition 4.3 is a straightforward exercise. So instead of showing it
here, we show its quantifier-free counterpart, Theorem 4.5. Everything carries over except
the arguments for (i)⇒ (ii) and (v)⇒ (i). The former of these implications was shown to
remain true by a more substantial argument in Shepherdson [She64]. First we gather a few
statements easily provable in PA− that will be useful at several occasions.
Lemma 4.4. PA− proves
(a) ∀x ∀y ∀z (x+ z < y + z → x < y),
(b) ∀x ∀y ∀z (x× z < y × z → x < y),
(c) ∀x ∀y (x < y → x+ 1 6 y),
(d) ∀x (x 6 n→ ∨∨k6n x = k) for every n ∈ N,
(e) ∀x (x < x+ 1), and
(f) ∀x (x 6= 0→ ∃y (x = y + 1)).
Proof. For (a) and (b), see the top of page 18 in Kaye [Kay91]. For (c) and (d), see
Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.6 in Kaye [Kay91] respectively.
For (e), we see that x+ 1 = (x+ 0) + 1 by axiom P6. So we are done by axiom P14.
For (f), work over PA−. If x 6= 0, then axiom P16 implies x > 0, and so we get the y we
want by P14.
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Theorem 4.5 (mostly Shepherdson). The following are equivalent for all n ∈ N:
(i) IOpen = PA− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula};
(ii) PA− + {I<x θ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula};
(iii) PA− + {I(n+ 1)-stepx θ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula};
(iv) PA− + {In+1x θ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula}.
Proof. We refer the reader to the original Shepherdson paper [She64] for a proof of (i)⇒ (ii).
We do not include a proof here because it would be too distracting for the present paper to
set up all the algebraic materials for the argument. Nevertheless, some of the ideas can be
found in Section 8.
Consider (ii)⇒ (iii). Work over (ii). Fix z¯ and let θ(x, z¯) be a quantifier-free LOR for-
mula such that ∃x ¬θ(x, z¯). Use (ii) to find x0 = (minx)(¬θ(x, z¯)). If x0 < n + 1, then∨∨
k<n+1 ¬θ(k, z¯) by Lemma 4.4(d). So suppose x0 > n+ 1. Then x0 > n by (the contrapos-
itive of) Lemma 4.4(c). Apply axiom P14 to find w0 such that x0 = n+w0 + 1 > w0. Then
θ(w0, z¯) holds by the minimality of x0, but ¬θ(w0 + n+ 1, z¯), as required.
The implication (iii)⇒ (iv) is clear.
Consider (iv)⇒ (i). Work over (iv). Fix z¯ and let θ(x, z¯) be a quantifier-free LOR for-
mula such that θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(x+ 1, z¯)). Then∧
k<n+1
θ(k, z¯) ∧ ∀x
( ∧
k<n+1
θ(x, z¯)→ θ(x+ n+ 1, z¯)
)
,
and so we are done by (iv).
The following small lemma will be handy when proving the quantifier-free analogue of
(i)⇒ (v) of Proposition 4.3.
Lemma 4.6. (a) IOpen ` ∀x, d ∃q, r (d 6= 0→ x = qd+ r ∧ r < d), but
(b) PA− 0 ∀x ∃y (x = 2y ∨ x = 2y + 1).
Proof. For the provability part, we follow Kaye [Kay90, page 5]. Work over IOpen. Take
any x, d with d 6= 0. Using the axioms of PA− and Lemma 4.4(f), one can routinely verify
that 0d 6 x < (x+ 1)d. Apply induction on q for the atomic formula qd 6 x to find q which
satisfies qd 6 x < (q + 1)d = qd + d. Then setting r = x − qd < qd + d − qd = d gives us
what we want.
For the unprovability part, consider the set Z[X]+ of all elements of the polynomial
ring Z[X] that either are zero or have positive leading coefficients. It is naturally a model
of PA−, as the reader can verify [Kay91, Section 2.1]. Clearly,
Z[X]+ |= ¬∃y (X = 2y ∨X = 2y + 1).
Proposition 4.7. IOpen proves
∀z¯ (θ(0, z¯) ∧ ∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(2x, z¯) ∧ θ(2x+ 1, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯))
for every quantifier-free LOR formula θ(x, z¯).
Proof. Work over IOpen. Let θ(x, z¯) be a quantifier-free LOR formula and z¯ be parameters
such that ∃x ¬θ(x, z¯). By Proposition 4.5(ii), this has a least witness, say x0. If x0 = 0, then
¬θ(0, z¯). So suppose x0 6= 0. Using Lemma 4.6, find y0 such that x0 = 2y0 or x0 = 2y0 + 1.
Since x0 6= 0, we know y0 < x0 by Lemma 4.4(f) and axiom P14. So θ(y0, z¯) by the
minimality of x0. We are thus done because ¬θ(2y0, z¯) ∨ ¬θ(2y0 + 1, z¯).
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Following the proof of Theorem V.4.6 in Ha´jek–Pudla´k [HP93], one can prove IOpen
from PA− plus the polynomial induction scheme for formulas of the form ∀y<t η(x, y, z¯)
where η(x, y, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula and t is an LOR term not involving y. The
use of this extra bounded quantifier cannot be eliminated.
Theorem 4.8 (Johannsen). PA− + {Ipxθ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LOR formula} does
not prove ∀x ∃y (x = 3y ∨ x = 3y + 1 ∨ x = 3y + 2). Consequently, it is strictly weaker
than IOpen.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2 in Johannsen [Joh93].
4.2. Variations of induction scheme and proof shape. All results of Section 3, with
the possible exception of Theorem 3.4, actually remain true when the induction scheme is
replaced by another scheme in Proposition 4.3. The proofs are straightforward modifications
of what we presented there, and hence are left to the reader. In this section we abstract one
part that may be of independent interest. This stems from the observation that, in a sense,
Proposition 2.9 is the only property of PA one needs in establishing Theorem 3.1.
Definition 4.9. Let L be a language. Denote by L (X) the language obtained from L by
adding one new unary predicate symbol X. Let S be a sentence in L (X). If ϕ(x, z¯) is an
L formula, then define Sϕ to be the universal closure of the L formula obtained from S
by replacing each occurrence of X(. . . ) by ϕ(. . . , z¯). The scheme determined by S, denoted
SL , is defined to be {Sϕ : ϕ ∈ L }. The scheme SL is mergeable over an L theory B if
for all L formulas ψ0, ψ1, there is an L formula ϕ such that B + Sϕ ` Sψ0 ∧ Sψ1.
Proposition 2.9 demonstrates the mergeability of the successor induction scheme over PA−.
A very similar proof shows that all other schemes in Proposition 4.3 are also mergeable
over PA−. Another example is the comprehension scheme in second-order arithmetic, which
is mergeable over rather weak base theories.
Theorem 4.10. Fix a language L . Let SL be a scheme and B be an L theory such that
B ` S>. The following are equivalent.
(i) SL is mergeable over B.
(ii) For every L sentence σ provable from B + SL , there exists an L formula ϕ(x, z¯) such
that B ` Sϕ↔ σ.
Proof. For (i)⇒ (ii), imitate the proof of Theorem 3.1. Conversely, suppose (ii) holds. Pick
arbitrary L formulas ψ0 and ψ1. Define σ = Sψ0 ∧ Sψ1. Then B + SL ` σ trivially. By
(ii), we get an L formula ϕ such that B ` Sϕ ↔ σ and hence B + Sϕ ` Sψ0 ∧ Sψ1, as
required.
Corollary 4.11. Let n ∈ N and let σ be an LOR sentence. The following are equivalent.
(i) PA ` σ.
(ii) There is a <-inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ σ.
(iii) There is an (n+ 1)-step inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ σ.
(iv) There is an (n+ 1)-inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ σ.
(v) There is a p-inductive formula ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)↔ σ.
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4.3. Walther’s method for comparing induction schemes. In the context of inductive
theorem proving, Walther [Wal92, Section 7] proposed a method of comparing induction
axioms. Let us formulate his method as follows. If B is a finite set of natural numbers and
S is a finite set of LOR terms, then define PA(B,S) to be the LOR theory axiomatized
by PA− and the following axioms for all LOR formulas θ(x, z¯):
∀z¯
(∧
k∈B
θ(k, z¯) ∧
∧
t∈S
∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(t(x, z¯), z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
In this terminology, the (n+ 1)-step induction scheme in Proposition 4.3(iii) is essentially
PA({k ∈ N : k < n+ 1}, {x+ n+ 1}).
(Some choices of B and S may give rise to a scheme PA(B,S) that is not true in N,
but this does not concern us here.) Walther observed that if B ⊆ B′ and S ⊆ S′, then
PA(B,S) ` PA(B′, S′).
In this section we make the observation (not stated in [Wal92]) that this method for
comparing induction schemes is incomplete in the sense that the converse implication is not
true. To see this, take m,n ∈ N such that m < n. Then
PA({k ∈ N : k < n+ 1}, {x+m+ 1})
≡ PA({k ∈ N : k < m+ 1}, {x+m+ 1})
≡ PA({k ∈ N : k < n+ 1}, {x+ n+ 1})
by Proposition 4.3. Clearly {x+m+ 1} 6⊆ {x+ n+ 1}.
Thanks to Theorem 4.5, the observation in the previous paragraph has an analogue
in the quantifier-free context. We formulate this as follows. If B is a finite set of natural
numbers and S is a finite set of LOR terms, then define IOpen(B,S) to be the LOR theory
axiomatized by PA− and the following axioms for all quantifier-free LOR formulas θ(x, z¯):
∀z¯
(∧
k∈B
θ(k, z¯) ∧
∧
t∈S
∀x (θ(x, z¯)→ θ(t(x, z¯), z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)).
Clearly, if B ⊆ B′ and S ⊆ S′, then IOpen(B,S) ` IOpen(B′, S′). The converse is not true
because whenever m,n ∈ N such that m < n, we have
IOpen({k ∈ N : k < n+ 1}, {x+m+ 1})
≡ IOpen({k ∈ N : k < m+ 1}, {x+m+ 1})
≡ IOpen({k ∈ N : k < n+ 1}, {x+ n+ 1})
by Theorem 4.5, but {x+m+ 1} 6⊆ {x+ n+ 1}.
5. Non-closure properties of cuts
In this short technical section we will establish an auxiliary result on cuts that will be used
in Section 6 and Section 7 for comparing solutions to ITP and notions of inductiveness
respectively. Note that the meaning of the word “cut” here is different from that in Section 2.2.
In the study of weak theories of arithmetic, these cuts are frequently used in interpretations.
They also serve as notions of smallness in many arguments. In the following, we borrow
some terminology from Visser [Vis14].
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Definition 5.1. A cut is an inductive formula ϕ(x) such that
PA− ` ∀x, y (x < y ∧ ϕ(y)→ ϕ(x)).
An a-cut is a cut ϕ(x) such that
PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ x)).
An am-cut is an a-cut ϕ(x) such that
PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x× x)).
Inductive formulas, cuts, a-cuts, and am-cuts are all different notions. This fact seems
to be well known, but we can find no proof of this in the literature. So we include one here.
The proof assumes familiarity with some parts of the Ha´jek–Pudla´k book [HP93].
Lemma 5.2. There are LOR formulas ϕ(x) and δ(x) such that
(1) ϕ(x) is an a-cut but not an am-cut;
(2) PA− ` ∃!x δ(x) ∧ ∀x (δ(x)→ ϕ(x)); and
(3) PA− ` ¬∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x× x))→ ∀x (δ(x)→ ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x× x)).
Proof. Let M |= PA which contains a nonstandard element a that is definable by a bounded
formula. For instance, if M |= ¬Con(PA), then we can take a to be the least (code of a) proof
of contradiction from PA in M . Fix a bounded formula δ0(x) such that M |= ∃!x δ0(x)∧δ0(a).
Notice
I = 2Na = {x ∈M : x < 2na for some n ∈ N}
is an initial segment of M , and 2ma × 2na = 2(m+n)a ∈ I whenever m,n ∈ N. So I is
itself an LOR structure. Since δ0(x) is a bounded formula, it is straightforward [HP93,
Remark IV.1.18] to check that a is the unique element which satisfies δ0(x) in I. We know
I |= I∆0 because I∆0 is preserved under taking initial segments [HP93, Remark IV.1.21].
Thus
log I = {x ∈ I : I |= ∃u (2x = u)}
is an initial segment of I that is closed under + because
I∆0 ` ∀x, y
(∃u (2x = u) ∧ y 6 x→ ∃v6u (2y = v))
∧ ∀u, v, x, y (2x = u ∧ 2y = v → 2x+y = uv),
as verified in Ha´jek–Pudla´k [HP93, Lemma V.3.8(iii) and page 302]. We know log I contains a
but not a2 because
log I = {x ∈ I : x < na for some n ∈ N}
and a 6∈ N. In particular, it is not closed under ×. The whole situation in I can be captured
by the sentence
σ = ϕ0(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ0(x)→ ϕ0(x+ x)) ∧ ∀x, y (x < y ∧ ϕ0(y)→ ϕ0(x))
∧ ∃!x δ0(x) ∧ ∃x (δ0(x) ∧ ϕ0(x) ∧ ¬ϕ0(x× x)),
where ϕ0(x) denotes the formula ∃u (2x = u). Clearly,
ϕ(x) = σ → ϕ0(x) and
δ(x) = (σ → δ0(x)) ∧ (¬σ → x = 0)
have the properties we want.
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Corollary 5.3.
(a) There is an inductive formula that is not a cut.
(b) There is a cut that is not an a-cut.
(c) There is an a-cut that is not an am-cut.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) and δ(x) be as given by Lemma 5.2.
(a) Take ϕ(x) ∨ ∃c (δ(c) ∧ x > c2).
(b) Take ∃c, z (ϕ(z) ∧ δ(c) ∧ x 6 c2 + z).
(c) Take ϕ(x).
Solovay’s method of shortening cuts [HP93, Theorem III.3.5] provides a general way of
producing cuts with various closure properties. However, a technique for producing cuts
with specific non-closure properties in large quantities does not seem available at present. In
particular, it is not clear whether there is an inverse of Solovay’s method.
Question 5.4. Let ϕ(x) be a cut. Assuming PA− 0 ∀x ϕ(x), can one always find a cut
ψ(x) such that PA− proves
∀x (ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)) and ∀x ϕ(x)↔ ∀x ψ(x)
and ψ(x) is not an am-cut?
6. Comparing solutions
Given a PA-theorem σ, our formulation of ITP considers the set of solutions, the search
space, to be all inductive ϕ(x) such that PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x) → σ. In automated theorem
proving, restrictions of the search space (usually such that completeness is retained) play an
important role. In this short section, based on the results of Section 5, we make a comment
on comparisons of two solutions ϕ0(x) and ϕ1(x).
There are (at least) two ways of comparing two induction axioms ∀x ϕ0(x) and ∀x ϕ1(x),
where ϕ0(x) and ϕ1(x) are inductive formulas. The first way is to say ∀x ϕ0(x) is stronger
than ∀x ϕ1(x) when PA− ` ∀x ϕ0(x) → ∀x ϕ1(x). The second way is to say ∀x ϕ0(x) is
stronger than ∀x ϕ1(x) when PA− ` ∀x (ϕ0(x)→ ϕ1(x)). Clearly, if an induction axiom is
stronger than another one in the second sense, then it is also stronger in the first sense. The
converse, however, is not true.
Proposition 6.1. There are cuts ϕ0(x), ϕ1(x) such that PA
− proves
∀x ϕ0(x)↔ ∀x ϕ1(x) and ∀x (ϕ0(x)→ ϕ1(x))
but PA− 0 ∀x (ϕ1(x)→ ϕ0(x)).
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be as given by Lemma 5.2. We show that ϕ0(x) = ϕ(x×x) and ϕ1(x) = ϕ(x)
have the properties we want.
As ϕ(x) is an a-cut, it is not hard to check that ϕ0(x) is a cut. Next, notice PA
− `
∀x ϕ(x) → ∀x ϕ(x× x) trivially. Thus PA− ` ∀x ϕ1(x) → ∀x ϕ0(x). Notice also that
PA− ` ∀x (ϕ(x× x)→ ϕ(x)) because ϕ(x) is a cut. So PA− ` ∀x (ϕ0(x)→ ϕ1(x)). Finally,
we know PA− 0 ∀x (ϕ1(x)→ ϕ0(x)) since ϕ(x) is not an am-cut.
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We can view Proposition 6.1 from another angle. One may expect that the weakest
induction axiom which can prove an induction axiom Iϕ0 is Iϕ0 itself. The proposition above
says that this is not the case if we adopt the second way of comparing induction axioms:
Iϕ0 may be provable from another induction axiom Iϕ1 where ϕ1(x) is a strictly weaker
than ϕ0(x) over PA
− as formulas. One may question whether there is always a weakest
induction axiom for proving a given theorem of PA in this sense. We do not know the
answer.
Question 6.2. Let ϕ0(x) be a cut. Assuming PA
− 0 ∀x ϕ0(x), can one always find a cut
ϕ1(x) such that PA
− proves
∀x ϕ0(x)↔ ∀x ϕ1(x) and ∀x (ϕ0(x)→ ϕ1(x))
but PA− 0 ∀x (ϕ1(x)→ ϕ0(x))?
As one can show by imitating our proof of Proposition 6.1, a positive answer to
Question 5.4 implies a positive answer to Question 6.2.
7. Comparing notions of inductiveness
The question of how an inductive theorem prover should choose the induction rule to be
applied to its current goal has received a great deal of attention in the literature on inductive
theorem proving. Pioneering work on this question has been done in the context of the
ACL2 system and its predecessor NQTHM through the introduction of the recursion analysis
technique [BM79]. This technique, which suggests an induction rule based on the type of
recursion present in the goal, is specific to goals involving primitive recursive functions; see
also Bundy et al. [BvHH+89] and Stevens [Ste88]. However, the choice of the induction rule
also plays an important role in other contexts; see the discussion on “induction revision” in
the book [BBHI05] by Bundy et al., for example.
The interest in this question comes from the tension between the choice of the induction
rule and the choice of the induction formula when proving a goal: the more flexibility we
have in choosing the induction rule, the less flexibility we need in choosing the induction
formula. In the very extreme case, one can fix an induction formula, e.g., the goal, and
search for an induction rule with respect to which this formula is inductive. Thus one can
dispose of the difficult task of finding a non-analytic induction formula and simply search for
a suitable induction rule. In this section we will carry out a comparison of the formulations
of induction introduced in Section 4 from this point of view: we fix a formula ϕ(x) and ask
with respect to which induction schemes it is inductive. Let X be any notion of inductiveness
defined in Section 4. Then we can state the computational problem
ITPX
Input: A sentence σ provable in PA
Output: An X-inductive formula ϕ(x) s.t. PA− ` ∀x ϕ(x)→ σ
By Proposition 4.3 all these problems define total relations. By Theorem 4.5, the quantifier-
free versions of ITPX are equivalent for all X except possibly polynomial induction.
In this section, we investigate implications between these notions of inductiveness. As
we will see, some notions turn out to be incomparable. For instance, not all 2-step inductive
formulas are 3-step inductive, and not all 3-step inductive formulas are 2-step inductive.
The following proposition lists all the implications we can establish.
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Proposition 7.1. Let m,n ∈ N.
(a) The following are equivalent for a formula: it is inductive; it is 1-step inductive; and it
is 1-inductive.
(b) If m+ 1 divides n+ 1, then all (m+ 1)-step inductive formulas are (n+ 1)-step inductive.
(c) If m 6 n, then all (m+ 1)-inductive formulas are (n+ 1)-inductive.
(d) All (n+ 1)-step inductive formulas are (n+ 1)-inductive.
(e) If a formula is (n+ 1)-inductive for some n ∈ N, then it is <-inductive.
(f) A formula ϕ(x) is <-inductive if and only if ∀x′6x ϕ(x′) is inductive.
Proof. Parts (a)–(d) are easy exercises.
(e) Suppose ϕ(x) is (n+ 1)-inductive. Work over PA−. Let y0 be such that ∀x<y0 ϕ(x). If
y0 6 n, then ϕ(y0) holds by Lemma 4.4(d) because ϕ(x) is (n+ 1)-inductive. So suppose
y0 > n. Use axiom P14 to find x0 such that y0 = x0 + n+ 1. Then
∧∧
k<n+1 ϕ(x0 + k)
because x0 + k < y0 for each k < n+ 1 by P14 again. As ϕ(x) is (n+ 1)-inductive and
y0 = x0 + n+ 1, this implies ϕ(y0).
(f) First, assume ∀x′6x ϕ(x′) is inductive. Work over PA−. Let y0 be such that ∀x<y0 ϕ(x).
If y0 = 0, then ϕ(y0) by our assumption. So suppose y0 6= 0. Apply Lemma 4.4(f) to
find y′0 such that y0 = y′0 + 1. Notice ∀x6y′0 ϕ(x) by Lemma 4.4(e). Our assumption
then implies ∀x6y0 ϕ(x), which, in particular, tells us that ϕ(y0).
Conversely, suppose ϕ(x) is <-inductive. Work over PA− again. With the help of P16,
P9 and P10, we have ϕ(0) trivially by <-inductiveness. So ∀x′60 ϕ(x′). Let x0 be
such that ∀x′6x0 ϕ(x′). Then Lemma 4.4(c) and (a) imply ∀x′<x0 + 1 ϕ(x′) and so
ϕ(x0 + 1) by <-inductiveness. This shows ∀x′6x0 + 1 ϕ(x′), as required.
We now proceed to show non-implications (based on the non-closure properties of
cuts established in Section 5). In particular, we show that beyond Proposition 7.1 there
is no further implication between “<-inductive”, the “(n + 1)-step inductive”s, and the
“(n+ 1)-inductive”s.
Proposition 7.2. Let m,n ∈ N.
(a) If (m+ 1) does not divide (n+ 1), then there is an (m+ 1)-step inductive formula that
is not (n+ 1)-step inductive.
(b) If m > n, then there is an (m+ 1)-inductive formula that is not (n+ 1)-inductive.
(c) If n > 1, then there is an (n+ 1)-inductive formula that is not (n+ 1)-step inductive.
(d) There is a <-inductive formula that is not (n+ 1)-inductive.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) and δ(x) be LOR formulas given by Lemma 5.2. Recall ϕ(x) is not an
am-cut. Take c ∈M |= PA− + ¬∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x2)) + δ(c).
(a) Assume all (m + 1)-step inductive formulas are (n + 1)-step inductive. Consider the
formula
χ(x) = ϕ(x) ∨ ∃y (x = (m+ 1)y).
We first show that χ(x) is (m+ 1)-step inductive. By our assumption on m and n,
this will imply χ(x) is (n+ 1)-step inductive. Work over PA−. We know
∧∧
k<m+1 χ(k)
because ϕ(x) is inductive. Take x0 satisfying χ(x0). If y0 is such that x0 = (m+ 1)y0,
then x0 +m+ 1 = (m+ 1)(y0 + 1) by P8 and P5, and thus χ(x0 +m+ 1). So suppose
¬∃y (x0 = (m+ 1)y). Then ϕ(x0) holds by the definition of the formula χ(x). As ϕ(x)
is an inductive formula, this implies ϕ(x0 +m+ 1) and hence χ(x0 +m+ 1).
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Now look at our model M . Let a = (m + 1)(n + 1)c2, so that M |= χ(a). Notice
M |= ¬ϕ(c2) by condition (3) in Lemma 5.2. So M |= ¬ϕ(a+ n+ 1) because ϕ(x) is a
cut and a + n + 1 = c2 + c2(mn + m + n) + n + 1 > c2 by axiom P14. However, the
previous paragraph tells us that M |= χ(a+ n+ 1). So M |= ∃y (a+ n+ 1 = (m+ 1)y)
by the definition of χ(x).
Find b ∈ M such that a + n + 1 = (m + 1)b. By axiom P14, we know (m + 1)b =
a + n + 1 > a = (m + 1)(n + 1)c2. So Lemma 4.4(b) implies b > (n + 1)c2. Apply
axiom P14 to find z ∈M such that (n+ 1)c2 + z + 1 = b. Then
a+ (m+ 1)(z + 1) = (m+ 1)(n+ 1)c2 + (m+ 1)(z + 1) = (m+ 1)b = a+ n+ 1
and thus (m+ 1)(z + 1) = n+ 1 by axioms P11 and P12. Now n+ 1 = z +m(z + 1) + 1.
Hence n+ 1 > z by axiom P14. Lemma 4.4(d) then tells us z ∈ N. We can thus conclude
that (m+ 1) divides (n+ 1), which is what we want.
(b) We show that the formula
ρ(x) = ϕ(x) ∨ ∀c
(
δ(c)→
∨
k<n+1
x = c2 + k
)
is an example we want.
Supposem > n. We show that ρ(x) ism-inductive. Work over PA−. If ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x2)),
then ∀x (ρ(x)↔ ϕ(x)) by condition (2) in Lemma 5.2, and so we are done by Proposi-
tion 7.1(a) and (c). So suppose ¬∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x2)). Since ϕ(x) is inductive, we know∧∧
k<m+1 ρ(k). Let c, x0 be such that δ(c) ∧
∧∧
k<m+1 ρ(x0 + k). Take k < n + 1. We
know c2 + k +m > c2 +m > c2 + n by axiom P12, and ¬ϕ(c2 + k +m) since ϕ(x) is a
cut and ¬ϕ(c2). These together imply ¬ρ(c2 + k+m). So x0 6= c2 + k because ρ(x0 +m)
holds. As the choice of k < n+ 1 is arbitrary, we know ϕ(x0) by the definition of ρ(x).
It follows that ϕ(x0 +m+ 1) because ϕ(x) is inductive. Hence ρ(x0 +m+ 1).
We now show that ρ(x) is not (n+ 1)-inductive using our model M . The definition
of ρ(x) tells us M |= ∧∧k<n+1 ρ(c2 + k). On the one hand, notice M |= ¬ϕ(c2) by
condition (3) in Lemma 5.2. Also c2 + n+ 1 > c2 by axiom P14. Hence ¬ϕ(c2 + n+ 1)
since ϕ(x) is a cut. On the other hand, notice c2 + n+ 1 > c2 + k for any k < n+ 1 by
axiom P12. These together say that M |= ¬ρ(c2 + n+ 1).
(c) We claim that the formula
ρ0(x) = ϕ(x) ∨ ∀c (δ(c)→ x = c2)
has the desired properties.
To show that ρ0(x) is (n + 1)-inductive, let us work over PA
−. As in the previous
part, we assume ¬∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x2)). Since ϕ(x) is inductive, we know ∧∧k<n+1 ρ0(k).
Let c, x0 be such that δ(c) ∧
∧∧
k<n+1 ρ0(x0 + k). As n > 1, we know ρ0(x0) ∧ ρ0(x0 + 1)
in particular. Notice ¬ϕ(c2 + 1) because ϕ(x) is a cut and ¬ϕ(c2) by condition (3) in
Lemma 5.2. Also c2 + 1 6= c2 by Lemma 4.4(e). Thus ¬ρ0(c2 + 1) holds, from which one
deduces x0 6= c2. This implies ϕ(x0) by the definition of ρ0(x). Since ϕ(x) is inductive,
we conclude that ϕ(x0 + n+ 1).
To show that ρ0(x) is not (n + 1)-step inductive, we use M as in the proof of (b).
Notice M |= ρ0(c2) by the definition of ρ0(x). On the one hand, we know M |= ¬ϕ(c2)
by condition (3) in Lemma 5.2. Also c2 +n+ 1 > c2 by axiom P14. Hence ¬ϕ(c2 +n+ 1)
since ϕ(x) is a cut. On the other hand, we know c2 + n+ 1 > c2 by P14. These together
say that M |= ¬ρ0(c2 + n+ 1).
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(d) It suffices to prove that the formula ρ(x) defined in the proof of (b) is <-inductive.
Work over PA−. Let c, y0 be such that δ(c) and ∀x<y0 ρ(x). We will show ρ(y0). If
y0 = 0, then ϕ(y0) because ϕ(x) is inductive, and so ρ(y0) holds. Therefore, assume
y0 6= 0. Apply Lemma 4.4(f) to find x0 such that y0 = x0 + 1. Notice y0 > x0 by
Lemma 4.4(e). So, by the choice of y0, we know ρ(x0).
Consider the case when ¬∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x2)). Then ¬ϕ(c2) by condition (3) in
Lemma 5.2. This implies c2 6= 0 because ϕ(x) is inductive. Use Lemma 4.4(f) to find w
such that c2 = w + 1. Then ¬ϕ(w) since ϕ(x) is inductive and ¬ϕ(w + 1) holds. Also,
Lemma 4.4(e) implies w < c2 6 c2 + k for each k < n+ 1. We thus know ¬ρ(w) by the
definition of ρ(x). Our assumption on y0 then implies x0 < x0+1 = y0 6 w < w+1 = c2.
Thus x0 6= c2 + k for any k < n+ 1 by axiom P9, and so ϕ(x0) must hold.
If ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x2)), then ∧∧k<n+1 ϕ(c2 +k) by conditions (1) and (2) in Lemma 5.2.
So ϕ(x0) in either case because ρ(x0) holds. Since ϕ(x) is inductive, we deduce ϕ(x0 + 1)
and hence ρ(y0), as required.
Buss’s notion of polynomial induction does not fit well into the picture.
Proposition 7.3. (a) There is a formula that is (n+ 1)-step inductive for every n ∈ N but
is not p-inductive.
(b) For every n ∈ N, there is a p-inductive formula that is not (n+ 1)-inductive.
Proof. (a) By Corollary 5.3(b), there is a cut that is not an a-cut. Such a cut is (n+ 1)-step
inductive for every n ∈ N, but it is not p-inductive.
(b) Let ϕ(x), δ(x) be LOR formulas given by Lemma 5.2. Define χ(x) to be the formula
ϕ(x) ∨ ∃c ∃s ∃`

δ(c) ∧
∨
k<n+1
(s)0 = c
2 + k ∧ (s)` = x
∧ ∀i<` ((s)i+1 = 2(s)i ∨ (s)i+1 = 2(s)i + 1)
∧ ∀i, j6` (i < j → (s)i < (s)j)
.
Here (s)i = x is the LOR formula expressing “the ith element in the sequence coded
by s is x” over PA− given in Jerˇa´bek [Jerˇ12]. It is then straightforward to see that
χ(x) is p-inductive. However, the formula χ(x) is not (n+ 1)-inductive because PA− `
∃c (δ(c) ∧∧∧k<n+1 χ(c2 + k)) and PA− 0 ∃c (δ(c) ∧ χ(c2 + n+ 1)).
We do not know whether all p-inductive formulas are <-inductive. What we have is
only a translation of this question into a model-theoretic language.
Proposition 7.4. The following are equivalent.
(i) There is a p-inductive formula that is not <-inductive.
(ii) In some model of PA−, there is a parameter-free definable element that is neither even
nor odd.
Proof. First, suppose (ii) fails. Let ϕ(x) be any LOR formula that is not <-inductive. Find
c ∈M |= PA−+ ∀x<c ϕ(x)∧¬ϕ(c). If c = 0, then PA− 0 ϕ(0) and we are done. So suppose
c 6= 0. Notice c = (minx)(¬ϕ(x)). It is, therefore, a parameter-free definable element of M .
The failure of (ii) then gives us d ∈ M such that c = 2d or c = 2d + 1. By Lemma 4.4(f)
and axiom P14, we know d < c. Hence M |= ϕ(d) by the minimality of c. This shows ϕ(x)
is not p-inductive.
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Conversely, suppose (ii) holds. Let c ∈ M |= PA− in which c is a non-even non-odd
parameter-free definable element. Find an LOR formula δ(x) that defines c in M . Define
ϕ0(x) to be
∃!y δ(y)→ ∃y (δ(y) ∧ x < y),
and let ϕ(x) be
∃s ∃` (ϕ0((s)0) ∧ (s)` = x ∧ ∀i<` ((s)i+1 = 2(s)i ∨ (s)i+1 = 2(s)i + 1)),
where (s)i = x is the LOR formula expressing “the ith element in the sequence coded by s
is x” in our proof of Proposition 7.3. Then ϕ(x) is p-inductive by construction. Notice
M |= ∀x<c ϕ0(x). So M |= ∀x<c ϕ(x) because PA− ` ∀x (ϕ0(x)→ ϕ(x)). However, every
element x ∈ M satisfying ϕ(x) must lie strictly below c or be either even or odd. Hence
M |= ¬ϕ(c) by our choice of c. We thus know ϕ(x) is not <-inductive.
Remark 7.5. All results in this paper about base-2 polynomial induction generalize to
other bases. Let us say an LOR formula ϕ(x) is (n+ 2)-p-inductive, where n ∈ N, if
PA− ` ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x)→
∧
k<n+2
ϕ
(
(n+ 2)x+ k
))
.
In this terminology, the p-inductive formulas are precisely the 2-p-inductive formulas. Let
m,n ∈ N. Then n + 2 being a power of m + 2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for
every (m+ 2)-p-inductive formula to be (n+ 2)-p-inductive. We omit the proof here.
8. Removing the order from the language
Another aspect of our formulation of ITP is that we search for an inductive formula in
the same language as the input sentence. In this section we consider a restriction of the
language of the inductive formula. Since most of our arguments about IOpen depend
on the presence (or, in fact, the quantifier-free definability) of the order < in LOR, it is
natural to ask whether IOpen really becomes strictly weaker when the induction scheme
is restricted to formulas in which < does not appear. It turns out that the induction
scheme for quantifier-free formulas in this restricted language is already provable in the base
theory PA−. According to Shepherdson [She67, page 27], this fact was first observed by
M. D. Gladstone. A stronger result was established by Shepherdson [She67, Theorem 2],
who proved the same scheme from a weak subtheory of PA−. If one starts from PA−, then
one can actually prove the least number principle (also known as the scheme of strong
induction, cf. Proposition 4.3(ii) and Theorem 4.5(ii)) for quantifier-free formulas in the
restricted language. This was pointed out by Richard Kaye in a conversation in April 2016.
With Kaye’s permission, we include his proof here. Many ideas in the proof were already
present in Shepherdson’s contribution [She64] to Theorem 4.5.
Definition 8.1. Denote the language {0, 1,+,×} for rings by LR. Define
IOpen(LR) = PA
− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is a quantifier-free LR formula}.
Let LOpen(LR) be the theory axiomatized by PA
− and the scheme
∀z¯ (∀y (∀x<y θ(x, z¯)→ θ(y, z¯))→ ∀x θ(x, z¯)),
where θ ranges over quantifier-free LR formulas.
The following elementary algebraic fact plays a key role in Kaye’s proof.
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Lemma 8.2. Let F be a field. For every polynomial p(x, a¯) in a single variable x with
coefficients a¯ ∈ F , the set {x ∈ F : p(x, a¯) = 0} is either finite or equal to F .
Theorem 8.3 (Kaye). PA− ` LOpen(LR).
Proof. Let M |= PA−. We will show M |= LOpen(LR). Fix a¯ ∈M . Consider a quantifier-
free LR formula θ(x, z¯). Put ¬θ(x, z¯) in disjunctive normal form∨
i6m
∧
j6n
(
pij(x, z¯) = 0 ∧ qij(x, z¯) 6= 0
)
,
where the pij ’s and the qij ’s are polynomials over Z. It suffices to show that for each i 6 m,
if some x ∈M satisfies ∧∧j6n(pij(x, a¯) = 0 ∧ qij(x, a¯) 6= 0), then there is a least such x. So
for notational convenience, let us assume m = 0, so that ¬θ(x, z¯) becomes∧
j6n
(
p0j(x, z¯) = 0 ∧ q0j(x, z¯) 6= 0
)
.
Since M is the non-negative part of a discretely ordered ring, we can further simplify the
formula ¬θ(x, z¯) to
p(x, z¯) = 0 ∧ q(x, z¯) 6= 0
by setting p(x, z¯) =
∑
j6n(p0j(x, z¯))
2 and q(x, z¯) =
∏
j6n q0j(x, z¯).
Assume M |= ∀y (∀x<y θ(x, a¯)→ θ(y, a¯)). We will construct a strictly decreasing
sequence (c`)`∈N of elements of M by recursion as follows. If M |= ∀x θ(x, a¯), then we are
done already. So suppose not, and take an arbitrary c0 ∈ M |= ¬θ(c0, a¯). Next, suppose
c` is found such that M |= ¬θ(c`, a¯). Using our assumption, pick any c`+1 < c` in M with
M |= ¬θ(c`+1, a¯) and carry on.
The result of this construction is an infinite sequence c0 > c1 > c2 > · · · of elements
of M such that p(c`, a¯) = 0 and q(c`, a¯) 6= 0 for all ` ∈ N. Lemma 8.2 then implies p(x, a¯)
is the zero polynomial. Hence, actually M |= ∀x (¬θ(x, a¯)↔ q(x, a¯) 6= 0). By an external
induction using our assumption in the previous paragraph, one sees that q(k, a¯) = 0 for all
k ∈ N. Applying Lemma 8.2 again, we conclude M |= ∀x q(x, a¯) = 0, as required.
The obvious argument [HP93, Lemma I.2.8] shows LOpen(LR) ` IOpen(LR). Therefore,
Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 8.3 tell us that IOpen(LR) is strictly weaker than IOpen. In terms
of computational problems we obtain that
ITPOpen(LR)
Input: A sentence σ provable in PA
Output: A quantifier-free LR formula θ(x, z¯) s.t. PA
− + Ixθ ` σ
is defined on strictly fewer inputs than
ITPOpen
Input: A sentence σ provable in PA
Output: A quantifier-free LOR formula θ(x, z¯) s.t. PA
− + Ixθ ` σ
To recover the strength of IOpen, it suffices to have induction for a single inequality.
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Theorem 8.4 (Shepherdson). PA− + {Ixθ : θ(x, z¯) is an atomic LOR formula} ` IOpen.
Proof. See page 83f in Shepherdson [She64].
9. Conclusion
What do we learn from these results for the automation of inductive theorem proving?
In comparison with successor induction and the uniform proof shape ITPU, both the
use of <-induction and that of the non-uniform proof shape ITP come at the price of
introducing a universal quantifier to the goals. However, both also come with a significant
pay-off: there are strictly more <-inductive formulas than (n + 1)-inductive formulas for
any n ∈ N. Similarly, the uniform proof shape ITPU is not complete while the non-uniform
proof shape ITP is complete (with respect to PA). Therefore, assuming the theorem proving
environment is able to deal with universal quantifiers in the assumptions of a goal efficiently,
these results clearly indicate to prefer <-induction over (n+ 1)-induction for any n ∈ N and
the ITP proof shape over the ITPU proof shape.
As Theorem 3.1 shows, the non-uniform proof shape ITP can be restricted to the
non-uniform equivalence proof shape ITPEq while preserving completeness, thus strongly
reducing the search space. Whether this can be exploited for practical applications in
inductive theorem proving is unclear to the authors. What would be needed is a practically
reasonable procedure for generating universal formulas which are PA−-equivalent to a given
sentence. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no such procedure has been devised for use
in inductive theorem proving yet. On a more theoretical note, Theorem 3.1 shows that the
essential difficulty of inductive theorem proving does not lie in finding an inductive formula
which is stronger than the goal (in the sense that it implies the goal over PA−); it is sufficient
to find an inductive formula as strong as the goal. Instead, the essential difficulty lies in the
non-analyticity of the inductive formula as discussed in Section 2.2.
The results of Section 8 illustrate the importance of the choice of the language for the
inductive formulas: allowing a single predicate symbol defined using a single quantifier can
increase the strength of the theory considerably.
From a broader perspective, we believe that this paper demonstrates the potential of
the use of methods and results from mathematical logic, and in particular, from theories
of arithmetic, in inductive theorem proving. In our opinion, a good illustration of this
potential is provided by Proposition 7.2. The construction of theorem-specific induction
rules has a long history in inductive theorem proving [BM79, BvHH+89, Ste88, BBHI05].
This approach is typically justified empirically by demonstrating, in the context of a certain
algorithm or implementation, that the option to switch to another induction rule allows to
solve more goals than before (by that particular algorithm or by a certain implementation
within a certain timeout). Proposition 7.2 provides a much more solid foundation to this
approach: if there are strictly more formulas which are inductive in sense X than in sense
Y an algorithm for inductive theorem proving can get trapped in a situation where the
induction formula currently under consideration allows a proof using rule X but does not
allow a proof using rule Y, regardless of which algorithm or implementation is used, since
there simply is no proof.
All of the results in this paper are restricted to arithmetical theories in the strict sense,
i.e., theories about the natural numbers. In inductive theorem proving, one typically works
in a broader syntactic setting of many-sorted first-order logic with inductive data types such
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as lists, trees, etc. Since many results about theories of arithmetic depend on results about
numbers, rings, etc., it is not straightforward to extend them to this more general syntactic
setting. Coding is not an option since it introduces an amount of syntactic complication
that is not realistic in inductive theorem proving. However, for the continuation of the line
of work in this paper we consider such an extension of the model theory of arithmetic to
be of high importance. One prototypical problem along this line is to classify (some of)
the benchmark examples from the TIP suite [CJRS15] according to the weakest induction
schemes (e.g., atomic, quantifier-free) required to prove them.
We believe, as argued in Section 2, that the non-analyticity of induction axioms is a key
aspect of inductive theorem proving, so we have considered the set of inductive formulas as
the search space in our model. In the case of theorem proving in pure first-order logic, the
search space is quite well understood theoretically and consequently we have very powerful
tools at our disposal for navigating in it such as (most general) unification, subsumption,
reduction orderings, (resolution) refinements, etc. At present, we do not seem to have a
similarly complete theoretical understanding of the set of inductive formulas and how they
relate to a given goal. We believe that further work in this direction is crucial for advancing
the state of the art in inductive theorem proving.
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